Abstract. A distributed consensus algorithm allows n processes to reach a common decision value starting from individual inputs. Wait-free consensus, in which a process always terminates within a finite number of its own steps, is impossible in an asynchronous shared-memory system. However, consensus becomes solvable using randomization when a process only has to terminate with probability 1. Randomized consensus algorithms are typically evaluated by their total step complexity, which is the expected total number of steps taken by all processes.
Introduction
Coordinating the actions of processes is crucial for virtually all distributed applications, especially in asynchronous systems. At the core of many coordination problems is the need to reach consensus among processes, despite the possibility of process failures. A (binary) consensus algorithm allows processes starting with input values in {0, 1} to agree on the same output value (agreement); to rule out trivial solutions, this common output must be one of the inputs (validity). Consensus is a fundamental task in asynchronous systems, and can be employed to implement arbitrary concurrent objects [Herlihy 1991] ; consensus is also a key component of the state-machine approach for replicating services [Schneider 1990; Lamport 1998 ].
Perhaps the most celebrated result in distributed computing shows that no deterministic algorithm can achieve consensus in an asynchronous system, if one process may fail [Fischer et al. 1985; Herlihy 1991; Loui and Abu-Amara 1987] . Due to the importance of the consensus problem, much research was invested in trying to circumvent this impossibility result. One successful approach is to allow randomized algorithms in which a nonfaulty process terminates only with probability 1. (The agreement and validity properties remain the same.) Randomized consensus algorithms are typically evaluated by their total step complexity, which is the expected total number of steps taken by all processes.
Many randomized consensus algorithms have been suggested, in different communication models and under various assumptions about the adversary (see Aspnes [2003] ). In particular, algorithms were designed to solve randomized consensus in asynchronous shared-memory systems, against a strong adversary that can observe the results of local coin flips before scheduling the processes [Abrahamson 1988; Aspnes and Herlihy 1990; Aspnes 1990; Saks et al. 1991] . The total step complexity of the best previously known algorithm is O(n 2 log n) [Bracha and Rachman 1991] . A lower bound of ( n 2 log 2 n ) on the expected total number of coin flips was proved by Aspnes [1998] ; this implies the same lower bound on the total step complexity.
Closing the gap of (log 3 n) between the lower and the upper bounds and determining the total step complexity of randomized consensus remained an intriguing open question.
In this article, we prove that (n 2 ) is a tight bound on the total step complexity of solving randomized consensus under the strong adversary in asynchronous shared memory systems, where processes communicate by reading and writing to multiwriter multi-reader registers.
The (n 2 ) lower bound is obtained by considering a restricted set of schedules with a round-based structure, called layers [Moses and Rajsbaum 2002] . We focus on configurations at the end of each layer and classify them according to their valence [Fischer et al. 1985; Moses and Rajsbaum 2002] , namely, the decisions that can be reached in layered extensions. Similarly to notions for deterministic algorithms, a configuration is univalent if there is only one possible decision value from all of the extensions of the execution from that configuration. If both decision values are possible then the configuration is bivalent. When a decision is reached, the configuration must be univalent, so the proof aims to avoid univalent configurations. As opposed to deterministic algorithms, where the valence of a configuration binds the extension to reach a certain decision value v, in a randomized algorithm the valence only implies that some execution will decide v with high probability
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20:3 [Aspnes 1998 ]. This leaves the possibility of null-valent configurations, from which no decision value is reached with high probability. When the configuration is nullvalent, we derive an isoperimetric inequality in order to control a one-round coinflipping game for reaching another null-valent configuration.
We show that the lower bound is tight, by presenting a randomized algorithm for consensus, which has an O(n 2 ) total step complexity. We give a shared coin algorithm with a constant agreement parameter, which leverages a single binary multiwriter register (in addition to n single-writer multi-reader registers). By viewing any schedule of the algorithm as a stochastic process, and applying Kolmogorov's inequality, we prove that for each possible decision value, all processes output that same value for the shared coin with constant probability. This can be used to obtain a randomized consensus algorithm with the same total step complexity [Aspnes and Herlihy 1990 ]. ) lower bound [Aspnes 1998 ] relies on a lower bound for coin flipping games. In this proof, the adversary schedules processes step-by-step, and the results of the games are analyzed through hyperbolic functions, resulting in a long and unwieldy proof. In contrast, our approach considers only the configurations at the end of layers, allowing powerful results about product probability spaces to be applied, and streamlining the analysis of the behavior of executions.
RELATED WORK. The previous (
Our general proof structure follows a proof by Bar-Joseph and Ben-Or [1998] of an ( √ n/ log n) lower bound on the expected number of rounds in a randomized consensus algorithm for the synchronous message passing model. In particular, like them, we treat null-valent configurations by considering one-round coin-flipping games and applying an isoperimetric inequality. Unlike their proof, our proof handles the more complicated shared-memory model and exploits the fact that in an asynchronous system, processes can be hidden in a one-round coin flipping game without having to fail for the rest of the execution.
1
The layered approach was introduced by Moses and Rajsbaum [2002] , who employed it to study deterministic consensus. They showed that the layered approach can unify the impossibility proof for asynchronous consensus [Fischer et al. 1985; Herlihy 1991; Loui and Abu-Amara 1987] with the lower bound on the number of rounds needed for solving synchronous consensus [Dolev and Strong 1983; Fischer and Lynch 1982] . Their work considered the message-passing model as well as the shared-memory model with single-writer registers. We take the layered approach one step further and extend it to randomized algorithms, deriving the lower bound on their total step complexity within the same framework as the results for deterministic algorithms. Besides incorporating randomization into the layered model, our proof also deals with the challenge of allowing processes to access multi-writer registers.
Abrahamson [1988] presented a randomized algorithm for solving consensus in asynchronous systems using shared memory, which had an exponential running time. The first polynomial algorithm for solving randomized consensus was presented by Aspnes and Herlihy [1990] . They described an algorithm that uses a shared coin in order to reach agreement and has a total step complexity of O(n 4 ). The amount of shared memory required by this algorithm was later bounded by Attiya et al. [1989] . Aspnes [1990] presented an algorithm for randomized consensus with O(n 4 ) total step complexity, which also uses bounded space. These algorithms were followed by an algorithm of Saks et al. [1991] with O(n 3 ) total step complexity and later, an algorithm of Bracha and Rachman [1991] with O(n 2 log n) total step complexity.
1.2. ORGANIZATION. In Section 2, we adapt the layered model to incorporate randomization and a strong adversary. Section 3 defines the key notions used in our lower bound proof-potence and valence-and proves that layered executions in the multi-writer shared-memory model are potence connected. The lower bound proof appears in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the algorithm. Section 6 contains a discussion and open problems.
A Layered Model for Randomized Distributed Algorithms
We consider a standard model of an asynchronous shared-memory system, where n processes, p 1 , . . . , p n , communicate by reading and writing to shared multi-writer multi-reader (atomic) registers (cf. Attiya and Welch [2004] and Lynch [1996] ).
Each step consists of some local computation, including an arbitrary number of local coin flips (possibly biased) and one shared memory event, which is a read or a write to some register.
In a randomized consensus algorithm, each process p i has an input value x i , and should decide on an output value y i . An algorithm for solving randomized consensus is f -tolerant if it satisfies the following requirements in a system where at most f processes can fail by crashing.
Agreement: For every two nonfaulty processes p i and p j , if y i and y j are assigned, then y i = y j . Validity: For every nonfaulty process p i , if y i is assigned, then y i = x j for some process p j . Termination: With probability 1, every nonfaulty process p i eventually assigns a value to y i .
A configuration C consists of the local states of all the processes, and the values of all the registers. Like many impossibility results, our proof relies on having configurations that are indistinguishable to all processes, except some set P. We denote C ¬P ∼ C if the state of all processes that are not in P is equal in both configurations C and C , and the values of all the registers are equal. We write C ¬ p ∼ C when P = {p}. For the purpose of the lower bound, we restrict our attention to a constrained set of executions, which proceed in layers. An f -layer is a sequence of at least n − f distinct process id's. When executing a layer L, each process p ∈ L takes a step, in the order specified by the layer.
An
. . is a (finite or infinite) sequence of f -layers. We will consider only configurations that are reachable by finite f -executions, namely, after some finite sequence of f -layers.
Since we consider randomized algorithms, for each configuration C there is a fixed probability for every step a process will perform when next scheduled. Denote by X C i the probability space of the steps that process p i will preform, if scheduled by the adversary. The probability space X C i depends only on the local state of p i in configuration C, and therefore, delaying p i does not change this probability space.
n be the product probability space. A vector y ∈ X C represents a possible result of the local coin flips from a configuration C. We assume a strong adversary that observes the processes' local coin flips, and chooses the next f -layer knowing what is the next step each process will take. The adversary applies a function σ to choose the next f -layer to execute for each configuration C and vector y ∈ X C , that is,
When the configuration C is clear from the context, we will use the abbreviation
Denote by (C, y, L y ) the configuration that is reached by applying steps of the processes in L y , for a specific vector y ∈ X C . Then, C • σ is a random variable whose values are the configurations (C, y, L y ), when y is drawn from the probability space X
C . An f -adversary α = σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . is a (finite or infinite) sequence of functions. Given a configuration C and a finite prefix α = σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ of the adversary α, C • α is a random variable whose values are the configurations that can be reached by the algorithm. For every vector y 1 ∈ X C , by abuse of notation, let Pr[ y 1 ] = Pr[ y 1 is drawn from X C ] denote the probability of y 1 in the probability space X C . The probability that a configuration C is reached is defined inductively:
where α is the remainder of the prefix after σ 1 , that is, α = σ 2 , . . . , σ , and the basis of the induction for α 1 = σ 1 is:
where χ C ( y 1 ) = χ C (C, α 1 , y 1 ) characterizes whether the configuration C is reached if y 1 is drawn, that is, 
where α is the remainder of the adversary after σ 1 , that is, α = σ 2 , σ 3 , . . . .
Potence and Valence of Configurations
In order to derive our lower bound, we are interested in the probability of reaching each of the possible decision values, from a given configuration. As the algorithm proceeds towards a decision, we expect the probability of reaching a decision to grow, where for a configuration in which a decision is reached, this probability is 1. This intuition is formalized as follows. Let k ≥ 0 be an integer, and define
Our proof makes use of adversaries that have a probability of 1 − k for reaching a certain decision value from a configuration reached after k layers. As the layer number k increases, the value of k decreases, and the probability 1 − k required for a decision grows. The value of k is set with foresight to achieve the stated bound. An adversary with a high probability of deciding is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. An f -adversary α from a configuration C that is reachable from an initial configuration by an f -execution with
Next, we classify configurations according to the probabilities of reaching each of the possible decisions from them. We adapt the notion of potence [Moses and Rajsbaum 2002 ] to fit randomized algorithms.
Instead of considering all possible adversaries, we further restrict our attention to a certain subset of them, which will be specified later. Definition 3.2. A configuration C that is reachable from an initial configuration by an f -execution with k ≥ 0 layers, is (v, k, S)-potent, for v ∈ {0, 1} and a set S of f -adversaries, if there is a v-deciding adversary α ∈ S from C.
We often say that C is v-potent (v-valent, bivalent, null-valent) with respect to S, when the number of layers k is clear from the context. Further, if the set S is also clear from the context, we will sometimes use the notation v-potent (v-valent, bivalent, null-valent) . Figure 1 illustrates the valence of configurations as follows. A configuration C is mapped to a point in the figure, according to the maximum probabilities over all adversaries for deciding 0 and for deciding 1 from C; the valence of C is determined by the area in which the respective point lies. For example, if this point lies beyond 1 − k on the x axis, it implies that there is an adversary σ from C with probability at least 1 − k for deciding 1. Therefore, C is either bivalent or 1-valent, depending on whether it lies beyond 1 − k on the y axis or not.
Note that a configuration can have a certain valence with respect to one set of adversaries S and another valence with respect to a different set S . For example, it can be univalent with respect to S and null-valent with respect to S = S; however, this cannot happen when S ⊆ S . (Another example appears in Lemma 3.4 below.)
The set of f -adversaries we consider, denoted S P , is induced by a subset of processes P ⊆ {p 1 , . . . , p n }. An adversary α is in S P , if all of the layers it may choose are P-free, where a layer is P-free if it does not include any process p ∈ P. Specifically, the set S ∅ is the set of all f -adversaries.
A layer is full with respect to S P if it contains the n − |P| distinct process identifiers { p 1 , . . . , p n }\P; otherwise, the layer is partial. Scheduling a partial layer without some process p ∈ P does not imply that p is failed, since the system is asynchronous, and p may appear in later layers. However, considering only adversaries in S P , for some nonempty set P, is equivalent to failing the processes in P since they do not take further steps.
Restricting a set of adversaries can only eliminate possible adversaries, and therefore cannot introduce potence that does not exist in the original set of adversaries, as formalized in the following simple lemma.
LEMMA 3.4. If a configuration C, reached after k layers, is v-valent with respect to S P , then it is notv-potent with respect to S P∪{ p} for any process p.
PROOF. Assume towards a contradiction, that there is a process p such that C isv-potent with respect to S P∪{ p} . Then, there exists av-deciding adversary α in S P∪{ p} , that is,
But α is also an adversary in S P because S P∪{ p} ⊆ S P , which implies that C isvpotent also with respect to S P , contradicting the fact that C is v-valent with respect to S P .
Let C be a configuration reached after some number of layers k, and fix a vector y 1 ∈ X C . We consider every configuration that can be reached by applying a single layer to C. We define a relation between these various configurations, based on their potence, which generalizes notions for deterministic algorithms suggested by Moses and Rajsbaum [2002] .
Definition 3.5. For a given vector y 1 , two configurations (C, y 1 , L) and (C, y 1 , L ) have shared potence with respect to S P , if they are both v-potent with respect to S P for some v ∈ {0, 1}.
We define potence connectivity between two layers, as the transitive closure of the above relation.
Definition 3.6. For a given vector y 1 , two configurations (C, y 1 , L) and
In particular, if (C, y 1 , L) and (C, y 1 , L ) have shared potence with respect to S P∪{ p} for some process p, then they are potence connected.
Our goal is to show that given C, y 1 and S P , if the set of all configurations of the form (C, y 1 , L) does not contain a null-valent configuration, then these configurations are potence connected with respect to S P . Therefore, if there are both 0-potent and 1-potent configurations in this set, then there must also be a bivalent configuration in it. This would imply that there is a nonunivalent configuration among this set, namely, a configuration that is not v-valent, for any v.
The following claims are used to prove this connectivity, by showing that specific configurations are potence connected. They are proved under the following assumption:
Assumption 3.7. Let C be a configuration, y 1 ∈ X C , and S P a set of adversaries. For every process p and every layer L, the configuration (C, y 1 , L) is univalent with respect to S P and S P∪{ p} .
is a layer where for some j, 1 ≤ j < , p i j and p i j+1 both write to the same register R, and
have the same potence with respect to S P∪{ p i j } . By Assumption 3.7, this implies that they have shared potence with respect to S P∪{ p i j } , since they are not null-valent.
is the layer L after adding p at the end, then (C, y 1 , L) and (C, y 1 , L ) have shared potence with respect to S P∪{ p} .
which implies that these two configurations have shared potence with respect to S P∪{ p} , and the claim follows.
If p performs a write operation to register R, then the states of all processes not in P ∪ {p} are the same in (C, y 1 , L) and in (C, y 1 , L ), but the value of R may be different.
If (C, y 1 , L) and (C, y 1 , L ) do not have shared potence with respect to S P∪{ p} , then since we assume they are univalent with respect to S P∪{ p} (Assumption 3.7), we have that for some v ∈ {0, 1}, (C, y 1 , L) is v-valent with respect to S P∪{ p} and (C, y 1 , L ) isv-valent with respect to S P∪{ p} . In particular, there is av-deciding adversary α ∈ S P∪{ p} from (C, y 1 , L ). Adding p at the beginning of the first layer of α yields a new adversary which is in S P , and isv-deciding when applied to (C, y 1 , L), since it is the same as applying α to (C, y 1 , L ). However, by Lemma 3.4, (C, y 1 , L) is v-valent with respect to S P , which is a contradiction. 
If p i j reads register R and p i j+1 writes to R, then
Both cases imply that (C, y 1 , L) and (C, y 1 , L ) are potence connected with respect to S P . The remaining case is when p i j and p i j+1 both write to the same register R. It may be that all the rest of the processes in the layer read from register R, and therefore distinguish between the two resulting configurations. Hence, we cannot argue in this case that the configurations have shared potence, but we can prove that they are potence connected. This is done by reverse induction on j.
Basis:
be the layer L after removing p i −1 , and L 2 = L . By Claim 3.8, (C, y 1 , L 0 ) and (C, y 1 , L 1 ) are potence connected with respect to S P , and by Claim 3.9, (C, y 1 , L 1 ) and (C, y 1 , L 2 ) are potence connected with respect to S P . The transitivity of potence connectivity implies that (C, y 1 , L 0 ) and (C, y 1 , L 2 ) are potence connected with respect to S P .
Induction step: Let
and let
be the layer L 0 after removing p i j . By Claim 3.8, (C, y 1 , L 0 ) and (C, y 1 , L 1 ) are potence connected with respect to S P . Let
be the layer L 1 after adding p i j at the end. By Claim 3.9, (C, y 1 , L 1 ) and (C, y 1 , L 2 ) are potence connected with respect to S P . For every m, 3
FIG. 2. Example of potence connected configurations: the first and second configuration are connected by Claim 3.9, the second and third are connected by Claim 3.10, while the third and fourth are connected by Claim 3.8.
be the previous layer L m−1 after swapping p i j with the process before it, until it reaches p i j+1 . Specifically,
By the induction hypothesis, (C, y 1 , L m ) and (C, y 1 , L m+1 ) are potence connected with respect to S P , for every m, 2 ≤ m < − j + 1. The transitivity of potence connectivity implies that (C, y 1 , L 0 ) and (C, y 1 , L − j+1 ) are potence connected with respect to S P . Figure 2 shows an example of using the claims, for the full layer L 0 and the partial layer L 1 obtained by removing the steps of p i and p n from L 0 . We show two layers L and L such that only one process, p n , distinguishes between the configurations lead to by L 0 and L , only one process, p i+1 , distinguishes between the configurations lead to by L and L , and only one process, p i , distinguishes between the configurations lead to by L and L 1 . Thus, the configurations lead to by L 0 and L 1 must be potence connected.
The following lemma shows that given a configuration C and a vector y ∈ X C , if there is a layer that extends C into a v-valent configuration and a layer that extends C into av-valent configuration, then we can find a layer that extends C into a non-univalent configuration, possibly by failing one additional process. 
PROOF. Assume towards a contradiction that for every layer L and every process p, the configuration (C, y 1 , L) is univalent with respect to both S P and S P∪{ p} (this implies that Assumption 3.7 holds). Let L F be the full layer with respect to S P consisting of all processes not in P, according to the order of their id's. Then, L F is univalent with respect to S P , say it is (v, k + 1, S P )-valent. 
We start with the layer L F and repeatedly swap processes until we reach the layer L , in a chain of configurations which, by Claim 3.10, are potence connected with respect to S P . From L , we repeatedly remove the last process until reaching the layer L v , in a chain of configurations which, by Claim 3.9, are potence connected with respect to S P . This implies that (C, y 1 , L F ) and (C, y 1 , L v ) are potence connected with respect to S P .
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Since
, and (C, y 1 , L 1 ) and (C, y 1 , L 2 ) have shared potence with respect to S P∪{ p} , for some process p. By Lemma 3.4 and our assumption that all layers lead to univalent configurations, (C, y 1 , L 1 ) is (v, k + 1, S P∪{ p} )-valent, and (C, y 1 , L 2 ) is (v, k + 1, S P∪{ p} )-valent, and hence, they cannot have shared potence with respect to S P∪{ p} . This yields a contradiction and proves the lemma.
The Lower Bound
Before presenting the lower bound proof, let us recall lower bound proofs and impossibility results for deterministic algorithms. In these proofs, the configurations are classified into univalent and bivalent configurations. Since a deciding configuration has to be univalent, these proofs aim to avoid univalent configurations by showing that there is an initial bivalent configuration, and by moving from one bivalent configuration to another bivalent configuration.
Our proof generalizes the above technique to randomized algorithms as follows. Recall that in addition to bivalent and univalent configurations, we have null-valent configurations, since valence is now a probabilistic notion. We first show that some initial configuration is not univalent (Lemma 4.1); namely, it is either bivalent or null-valent.
Ideally, we would like to complete the proof by showing that a nonunivalent configuration can be extended by a single layer to a nonunivalent configuration, while (permanently) failing at most one more process. Doing so would allow us to construct a layered execution with f layers, each containing at least n − f process steps, which implies the desired lower bound.
In Lemma 4.7 (Section 4.4), we show that this can be done with high probability in the case of null-valent configurations, that is, we can extend a null-valent configuration by one layer and reach another null-valent configuration.
A bivalent configuration, can be extended with both a v-deciding adversary and av-deciding adversary, which we would like to use in Lemma 3.11 to obtain a nonunivalent configuration. However, some complications arise here, which are taken care of in Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 (Section 4.2).
We extend the execution in this manner, with high probability, for f layers. Since n − f processes take a step in each layer, we obtain the bound of an expected ( f (n − f )) steps (Theorem 4.8). 4.1. INITIAL CONFIGURATIONS. We start by applying Lemma 3.4 to show that some initial configuration is not univalent. 4.2. BIVALENT AND SWITCHING CONFIGURATIONS. As mentioned before, from a bivalent configuration we have both a v-deciding adversary and av-deciding adversary. However, we cannot use them directly in Lemma 3.11 to obtain a nonunivalent configuration, since the first layer of a v-deciding adversary may still lead to av-valent configuration, because these definitions are probabilistic. If k was an increasing function of k, the above situation would have small enough probability in order to simply neglect it. However, this cannot be done, since k is defined as a decreasing function of k, in order to handle the null-valent configurations.
Instead, we prove (Lemma 4.3) that by failing at most one more process, a bivalent configuration can be extended by a single layer to a non-univalent configuration, or to a configuration which isv-valent although reached while following a v-deciding adversary. Such a configuration, as will be formalized below, is calledv-switching.
We also prove that there is a small probability of deciding in a switching configuration and thus, from a switching configuration, the execution can be extended (with high probability) to a non-univalent configuration, by at least one layer (Lemma 4.4).
We formally define switching configurations as follows:
. . be a v-deciding adversary from C in S P , and let y 1 be a vector in X C such that the configuration (C, y 1 , σ 1 ( y 1 )) is (v, k + 1, S P )-valent. Then (C, y 1 , σ 1 ( y 1 )) is ā v-switching configuration with respect to S P from C by y 1 and α. Lemma 4.3 implies that a bivalent configuration can be extended with one layer to a configuration that is either switching or nonunivalent. LEMMA 4.3. If a configuration C is (k, S P )-bivalent, then there is an adversary σ such that for every vector y 1 ∈ X C , (C, y 1 , σ ( y 1 )) is eitherv-switching for some v ∈ {0, 1}, or not (k + 1, S P )-univalent or not (k + 1, S P∪{ p} )-univalent, for some process p.
PROOF. Assume that for every layer L and every process p, the configuration (C, y 1 , L) is univalent with respect to S P and to S P∪{ p} .
Consider the extension of C with L F , the full layer with respect to S P . Fix a vector y 1 ∈ X C and assume that
Consider the configuration C = (C, y 1 , σ 1 ( y 1 )). By the assumption, C is univalent. If it is (v, k + 1, S P )-valent then it isv-switching with respect to S P from C by y 1 and α. Otherwise, it is (v, k + 1, S P )-valent. Since C is (v, k + 1, S P )-valent, by Lemma 3.11, there exists a layer L and a process p such that (C, y 1 , L) is either not (k + 1, S P )-univalent or not (k + 1, S P∪{ p} )-univalent.
The main issue when reaching av-switching configuration is that we cannot rule out the possibility that all the other layers lead tov-valent configurations as well. However, although av-switching configuration isv-valent, the adversary that leads to it is v-deciding. This allows us to look several layers ahead, for the desired situation of one layer leading to a v-valent configuration, and another layer leading to av-valent configuration. From such a setting, Lemma 3.11 can be used to reach a non-univalent configuration again. The following lemma presents the details of this argument.
LEMMA 4.4. Let C be av-switching configuration with respect to S P from C by y 1 and α. Then, with probability at least 1 − 1 n √ n , C can be extended with at least one layer to a configuration that is either v-switching, or not univalent with respect to S P , or not univalent with respect to S P∪{ p} , for some process p.
PROOF. Let α = σ 1 σ 2 · · · ; note that C = (C, y 1 , σ 1 ( y 1 )). Denote C 0 = C, C 1 = C and for every k ≥ 2, fix a vector y k ∈ X C k−1 and let
Assume that for every k ≥ 1, C k is univalent, and let C be the first configuration that is v-valent with respect to S P . If such a configuration does not exist then the execution either reaches a configuration that decidesv, or does not reach any decision. Since α is v-deciding from C, the probability that C does not exist is at
Since C is the first configuration which is v-valent, C −1 isv-valent. Therefore, there is av-deciding adversary β = ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . from C −1 in S P . Consider the configuration C = (C −1 , y , ρ 1 ( y )). If C is not (k + , S P )-univalent, then we are done. If C isv-valent, then since C is v-valent, by Lemma 3.11, there exists a layer L such that (C −1 , y , L) is either not (k + , S P )-univalent or not (k + , S P∪{ p} )-univalent, for some process p, in which case we are also done. Otherwise, C is v-valent, which implies that it is v-switching with respect to S P from C −1 by y and β.
ONE-ROUND COIN-FLIPPING GAMES. The remaining part of the lower bound proof deals with null-valent configurations, and it relies on results about one-round coin-flipping games. As defined by Bar-Joseph and Ben-Or [1998], a U -valued one-round coin flipping game of m players is a function
where X i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is the ith probability space. A t-hiding adversary may hide at most t of the random choices in X 1 , . . . , X m , by replacing them with a ⊥. Before presenting the formal definitions for the adversary and the game, we describe one main difference in the way that null-valent and bivalent configurations are handled. We have shown in Section 4.2 that in order to reach a bivalent configuration from a bivalent configuration, it suffices to fail one process per layer. This process is failed permanently, and may not take steps in any later layer. The case of a null-valent configuration is different. We may need to hide many more processes in a layer in order to reach another null-valent configuration. Fortunately, these processes are only hidden in this layer and may take steps in subsequent layers, which implies that they are not failed according to the definition of an asynchronous system. Therefore, we do not need to account for them towards the f processes that we are allowed to fail, and hence their number can be non-constant.
Formally, let X = X 1 × · · · × X m be the product probability space implied by the game. For every vector y ∈ X , and I ⊆ {1, . . . , m}, the vector reached when the adversary hides the coordinates of I is defined as follows:
For every possible outcome of the game u ∈ {1, . . . , U }, define the set of all vectors in X for which no t-hiding adversary can force the outcome of the game to be u, to be
We prove that when |U | = 3, there is an outcome for which there is high probability for hiding values in a way that forces this outcome; that is, for some u ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Pr[ y ∈ W u ] is very small. The proof relies on an isoperimetric inequality, following a result of Schechtman [1981] . The idea is to show that if all three sets W 1 , W 2 , W 3 ⊆ X have large enough probability, then there is a non-zero probability for an element z ∈ X that is close to all three sets according to the Hamming distance. This will imply the existence of a t-hiding adversary for z, for which the value of the game cannot be any of 1, 2 or 3, and hence there is a point for which the game is undefined.
Formally, the space (X, d) is a finite metric space where for every pair of vectors x and y in X , d( x, y) is the Hamming distance between x and y (the number of coordinates in which x and y differ). For A ⊆ X , B(A, t) is the ball of radius t around the set A, that is,
The next lemma is the isoperimetric inequality we rely on. We show that given the probability of a set A, there is a lower bound on the probability of the ball of a certain radius around A. 
PROOF. Consider an element x as a random function
Let f : X → R be a function that measures the distance of elements from the given subset A ⊆ X , i.e.,
Choose a random element of w ∈ X according to the given distribution. Define
with probability 1, and Y m = f ( w) with the probability of choosing w. It is well known that Y 0 , . . . , Y m is a Doob martingale (see Alon and Spencer [2000, Chap. 7] and Motwani and Raghavan [1995, Chap. 4 
]).
Notice that X 1 , ..., X m are independent and therefore for every i ∈ D, the random variable x(i) is independent of other values of x.
The function f satisfies the Lipschitz condition, that is, for every 2 vectors x, y that differ only in By Azuma's inequality, we have that for every real number λ > 0
(1)
, we have that 2e
Hence, for every ≥ λ 0 , we have
, which completes the proof.
We now use Lemma 4.5 to show that one of the sets W u has a small probability, and deduce that for u = 1, 2 or 3 the outcome of the game can be forced to be u with high probability. LEMMA 4.6. For every 3-valued one-round coin-flipping game of m players, there is a t-hiding adversary, t = 6 2m log(m 3 ), that can force the outcome of the game to be some u ∈ {1, 2, 3} with probability greater than 1 − 1 m 3 . PROOF. Recall that for every u ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the set W u is the set of all vectors in X for which no t-hiding adversary can force the outcome of the game to be u. We wish to prove that Pr[ y ∈ W u ] < 1 m 3 , for some u ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
). Assume that Pr[ y ∈ W u ] ≥ 1 m 3 for all u ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Clearly, u∈{1,2,3} W u = ∅, since the value of the game is undefined for points in the intersection. Moreover, we claim that u∈{1,2,3} B u is empty. Assume there is a point z ∈ u∈{1,2,3} B u (see Figure 3) . For every u ∈ {1, 2, 3}, since z ∈ B u , there is a point x u ∈ W u and a set of indices I u ⊆ {1, . . . , m}, such that |I u | ≤ Since u∈{1,2,3} B u = ∅, we have that
which implies that
This contradiction implies that for some u ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have Pr[
4.4. NULL-VALENT CONFIGURATIONS. In the final stage of the lower bound construction, we use one-round coin-flipping games to show that, with high probability, a null-valent configuration C can be extended with one f -layer to a nullvalent configuration. In order to achieve the above, we may need to hide up to 6 2n log (2n 3 ) processes, other than the processes in P, in the layer. Therefore, we assume that f ≥ 12 2n log (2n 3 ), and will always make sure that |P| ≤ f 2 . This will allow us to hide f 2 ≥ 6 2n log (2n 3 ) additional processes (not in P), in executions in S P .
LEMMA 4.7. If a configuration C reachable by an f -execution is (k, S P )-nullvalent, then with probability at least 1 −
PROOF. Let C be a (k, S P )-null-valent configuration. We consider every vector y 1 ∈ X C and every layer L in S P , and classify the resulting configurations (C, y 1 , L) into three disjoint categories:
Notice that the first category contains both (0, k + 1, S P )-valent and (k + 1, S P )-bivalent configurations.
This can be viewed as a 3-valued one-round coin-flipping game of m players, as follows. The m players are the processes not in S P , that is, m = n − |P|. The probability spaces X 1 , . . . , X m represent the random choices of the processes, which are given by y 1 . Every vector of choices induces a resulting configuration (C, y 1 , L F ), where L F is the full layer with respect to S P , in which the processes take a step in the order of their identifiers. Hiding an element X i by the adversary is done by choosing a partial layer L in S P that does not contain any step by the corresponding processes, but only a step of each process that is not hidden. Finally, the value of the game is the category of the configuration (C, y 1 , L) .
Since m = n − |P|, we have that n − f ≤ m ≤ n. By the coin flipping game in Lemma 4.6, we can hide 6 2m log(2m 3 ) processes and force the resulting configuration into one of the above categories with probability at least 1 − 1 m 3 . This implies that for one of the above categories, with probability at least 1 − 1 m 3 , the vector y 1 ∈ X C has a corresponding partial layer L y 1 , such that the configuration (C, y 1 , L y 1 ) has the valence of that category. We now define the adversary σ 1 as the function that for every vector y 1 ∈ X C chooses the corresponding partial layer L y 1 , that is, σ 1 ( y 1 ) = L y 1 . Our claim is that the category that can be forced by σ 1 is the third one, that is, the resulting configuration is null-valent.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that the category that can be forced is the first one. This implies that the probability over all vectors y 1 ∈ X C that (C, y 1 , L y 1 ) is (0, k +1, S P )-potent is at least 1− 1 m 3 . Therefore, with probability at least 1− 1 m 3 , the vector y 1 ∈ X C is such that there exists a 0-deciding adversary α from (C, y 1 , L y 1 ) for which: 1 m 3 , there exists an adversary α = σ 1 , α from C such that:
where the last inequality holds for sufficiently large n,
A similar argument holds for the second category. Hence, with probability at least 1 − 1 m 3 , the third category can be forced, namely, we can reach a configuration that is (k + 1, S P )-null-valent. 4.5. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER. We can now put the pieces together and prove the lower bound on the total step complexity of any randomized consensus algorithm.
THEOREM 4.8. The total step complexity of any f -tolerant randomized consensus algorithm in an asynchronous system, where n − f ∈ (n) and f ≥ 12 2n log 2n 3 , is ( f (n − f )).
PROOF. We show that the probability of forcing the algorithm to continue f 2 layers is at least 1 − 1 √ n . Therefore, the expected number of layers is at least
. Each of these layers is an f -layer containing at least n − f steps, implying that the expected total number of steps is at least
We argue that for every
, with probability at least 1 − k
, there is a configuration C reachable by an f -execution with at least k layers, which is either v-switching or nonunivalent with respect to S P where |P| ≤ k + 1. Once the claim is proved, the theorem follows by taking k = f 2 , since the probability of having an f -execution with more than f 2 layers is at least 1 −
. We prove the claim by induction on k. Basis: k = 0. By Lemma 4.1, there exists an initial configuration C that is not univalent with respect to S ∅ or S { p} , for some process p.
Induction step: Assume C is a configuration reachable by an f -execution with at least k layers, that is either v-switching or nonunivalent with respect to S P where 1 n √ n , C can be extended with at least one layer to a configuration C that is either v-switching or nonunivalent with respect to S P where |P | ≤ k + 2. This implies that C exists with probability
. If C is bivalent, then by Lemma 4.3, there exists an adversary σ and a process p such that C•σ is either v-switching or not (k+1, S P )-univalent or not (k+1, S P∪{ p} )-univalent.
If C is v-switching, then by Lemma 4.4, there exists a finite adversary α and a process p such that with probability at least 1 − 1 n √ n , C • α is eitherv-switching, or not univalent with respect to S P , or not univalent with respect to S P∪{ p} .
If C is null-valent, then by Lemma 4.7, there exists an adversary σ 1 such that the configuration C • σ 1 is not (k + 1, S P )-univalent with probability at least 1
Finally, taking f ∈ (n) and n − f ∈ (n), we get a lower bound of (n 2 ) on the total step complexity.
A Matching Upper Bound
This section presents a randomized consensus algorithm with O(n 2 ) total step complexity, by introducing a shared coin algorithm with a constant agreement parameter and O(n 2 ) total step complexity. In a shared coin algorithm with agreement parameter δ, each process outputs a decision value −1 or +1, such that for every v ∈ {−1, +1}, there is a probability of at least δ for all processes to output the same value v [Aspnes and Herlihy 1990] . Using a shared coin algorithm with O(n 2 ) total step complexity and a constant agreement parameter in the scheme of Aspnes and Herlihy [1990] , implies a randomized consensus algorithm with O(n 2 ) total step complexity.
As in previous shared coin algorithms [Saks et al. 1991; Bracha and Rachman 1991] , in our algorithm the processes flip coins until the amount of coins that were flipped reaches a certain threshold. An array of n single-writer multi-reader registers records the number of coins each process has flipped, and their sum. A process reads the whole array in order to track the total number of coins that were flipped.
Each process decides on the value of the majority of the coin flips it reads. Our goal is for the processes to read similar sets of coins, in order to agree on the same majority value. For this to happen, we bound the total number of coins that are flipped (by any process) after some process observes that the threshold was exceeded. A very simple way to guarantee this property is to have processes frequently read the array in order to detect quickly that the threshold was reached. This, however, increases the total step complexity. Therefore, as in previous shared coin algorithms, we have to resolve the tradeoff between achieving a small total step complexity and a large (constant) agreement parameter.
The novel idea of our algorithm in order to avoid this tradeoff, is to utilize a multiwriter register called done that serves as a binary termination flag; it is initialized to false. A process that detects that enough coins were flipped, sets done to true. This allows a process to read the array only once in every n of its local coin flips, but check the register done before every local coin flip. The pseudocode appears in Algorithm 1. In addition to the binary register done, it uses an array A of n single-writer multi-reader registers, each with the following components (all initially 0): count: how many flips the process performed so far. sum: the sum of coin flips values so far.
Each process keeps a local copy a of the array A. The collect in lines 6 and 8 is an abbreviation for n read operations of the array A.
For the proof, fix an execution α of the algorithm. We will show that all processes that terminate agree on the value 1 for the shared coin with constant probability; by symmetry, the same probability holds for agreeing on −1, which implies the algorithm has a constant agreement parameter.
The total count of a specific collect is the sum of a [1].count, . . . , a[n] .count, as read in this collect. Note that the total count read in Line 8 is ignored, but it can still be used for the purpose of the proof.
Although we only maintain the counts and sums of coin flips, we can (externally) associate them with the set of coin flips they reflect; we denote by F C the collection of coin flips that are written in the shared memory by the first time that true is written to done. The size of F C can easily be bounded, since each process flips at most n coins before checking A.
LEMMA 5.1. F C contains at least n 2 coins and at most 2n 2 coins.
PROOF. Clearly, true is written to done in line 7 only if the process reads at least n 2 flips, therefore |F C | ≥ n 2 . Consider the point in the execution after n 2 coins were written. Each process can flip at most n more coins until reaching line 7, and then it writes true to done. Therefore when true is written to done there are at most 2n 2 coins written, and |F C | ≤ 2n 2 .
For a set of coins F we let Sum(F) be the sum of the coins in F. We denote by F i the set of coin flips read by the collect of process p i in Line 8. This is the set according to which the process p i decides on its output, that is, p i returns Sum (F i After true is written to done, each process (except the process that had written true to done) can flip at most one more coin before reading that done is true in Line 1. Therefore, the set of coins that are written when the process reads Line 8 is the set of coins that were written when true was written to done (which is F C ), plus at most n − 1 additional coins.
We now show that there is at least a constant probability that Sum(F C ) ≥ n. In this case, by Lemma 5.2, all processes that terminate agree on the value 1, since F i contains at most n − 1 additional coins.
We partition the execution into three phases. The first phase ends when n 2 coins are written. After every coin is written there may be up to n − 1 additional coins that are already flipped but not yet written. The adversary has a choice whether to allow each of these coins to be written. We assume an even stronger adversary that can choose the n 2 written coins out of n 2 + n − 1 coins that were flipped. The second phase ends when true is written to done. In the third phase, each process reads the whole array A and returns a value for the shared coin. (See Figure 4. ) Since F C is the set of coins written when done is set to true, then it is exactly the set of coins written in the first and second phases. Let F first be the first n 2 coins that are written, and F second = F C \F first . This implies that Sum(F C ) = Sum(F first ) + Sum(F second ). Therefore, we can bound (from below) the probability that Sum(F C ) ≥ n by bounding the probabilities that Sum(F first ) ≥ 3n and Sum(F second ) ≥ −2n.
Consider the sum of the first n 2 + n − 1 coin flips. After these coins are flipped, the adversary has to write at least n 2 of them, which will be the coins in F first . If the sum of the first n 2 + n − 1 coin flips is at least 4n then Sum(F first ) ≥ 3n. We bound the probability that this happens using the Central Limit Theorem.
LEMMA 5.3. The probability that Sum(F first ) ≥ 3n is at least
PROOF. There are N = n 2 + n − 1 coins flipped when n 2 coins are written to F first . By the Central Limit Theorem, the probability for the sum of these coins to be at least x √ N , converges to 1 − (x), where (x) = Each collect performed by p i in Line 6, can be associated with the n local coins that can be flipped by p i before it. By Lemma 5.1, there are at most 2n 2 coins in F C , that is, at most 2n 2 coin flips during the first and second phases of the algorithm. Therefore, during these phases there can be at most 2n 2 n = 2n collects performed by processes in Line 6. In the third phase, every process may perform another collect in Line 6, and another collect in Line 8, yielding at most 2n additional collects. Thus, there are at most 4n collects performed during the algorithm, yielding a total of O(n 2 ) steps.
Using Algorithm 1 in the scheme of Aspnes and Herlihy [1990] yields a randomized consensus algorithm. Informally, their scheme uses single-writer registers in which the processes update their preferences (starting with their inputs), and allows the processes to collect the values of these registers in order to detect agreement. If fast processes agree then they decide their preference and a slow process also adopts it, otherwise a process changes its preference according to the result of the shared coin. Given a shared coin algorithm with agreement parameter δ and step complexity T , the scheme yields a randomized consensus algorithm with O(δ −1 T ) expected step complexity. Since our shared coin algorithm has a constant agreement parameter and O(n 2 ) step complexity, we get the next theorem:
THEOREM 5.7. There is a randomized consensus algorithm with O(n 2 ) total step complexity.
Discussion
We have shown that (n 2 ) is a tight bound on the total step complexity of solving randomized consensus, under a strong adversary, in an asynchronous sharedmemory system using multi-writer registers. Aspnes [1998] shows an ( n 2 log 2 n ) lower bound on the expected total number of coin flips. Our layering approach as presented here, does not distinguish between a deterministic step and a step involving a coin flip, leaving open the question of the optimal number of coin flips.
Our algorithm exploits the multi-writing capabilities of the register. The best known randomized consensus algorithm using single-writer registers [Bracha and Rachman 1991] has O(n 2 log n) total step complexity, and it is intriguing to close the gap from our lower bound.
In addition to settling the open question of the asymptotic total step complexity, we consider an important contribution of this article to be in introducing new techniques for investigating randomized consensus algorithms. These techniques provide a new context and opportunities for exploring several research directions, two of which are discussed next.
One direction is to study the individual step complexity of randomized consensus; namely, the expected number of steps performed by a single process. Aspnes and Waarts [1996] present a shared coin algorithm in which each process performs O(n log 2 n) expected number of steps; their algorithm has O(n 2 log 2 n) total step complexity. Their shared coin algorithm is similar to Bracha and Rachman [1991] , but the local flips of a process are assigned increasing weights, which allows fast processes to terminate earlier. In a recent work [Aspnes et al. 2008] , we have shown that the individual step complexity can be reduced to O(n log n), using a multi-writer register; reducing the individual step complexity further, or avoiding the use of a multi-writer register, remain open questions.
Our results may also provide new insight into the expected step complexity of randomized consensus under weak adversaries that cannot observe the local flips or the contents of the shared memory. Several papers presented randomized consensus algorithms for this type of adversaries, (e.g., Aumann and Bender [2005] , Aumann [1997] , Chandra [1996] , Chor et al. [1987] , and Aumann and Kapah-Levy [1999] ), with the best algorithms having O(n polylog(n)) total step complexity and O(polylog(n)) individual step complexity.
Weaker adversaries have also been studied in message passing systems. In the full information model, the adversary is computationally unbounded and has access to all messages, but not to the processes' random bits. Furthermore, the adversary is nonadaptive, that is, chooses the faulty processes before the algorithm begins. Several papers develop algorithms for Byzantine Agreement or Leader Election in the full information model [Ben-Or et al. 2006; Goldwasser et al. 2006; King et al. 2006a; King et al. 2006b; Kapron et al. 2008] . Our lower bound on the expected total step does not apply to this model since we assume a much stronger adversary. Recently , we have applied techniques used to show potence connectivity in Section 2 to bound the termination probability of bounded consensus algorithms, under a very weak adversary.
